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Balance in competition in Dutch soccer
Ruud H. Koning
University of Groningen, the Netherlands
[Received August 1999. Revised April 2000]
Summary. We estimate an ordered probit model for soccer results in the Netherlands. The result
of a game is assumed to be determined by home ground advantage and differences in quality
between the opposing teams. The parameters of the model are used to assess whether the balance
in competition in Dutch professional soccer has changed over time. Contrary to popular belief, we
®nd that the balance has not changed much since the mid-1970s.
Keywords: Balance in competition; Home advantage; Ordered probit model; Professional soccer
1. Introduction
Professional soccer is a big business today. Broadcasting rights for 4 years have been sold in
England for approximately US $1 billion, a typical sponsor contract for a top European team is
valued at US $6 million (yearly) and the annual salary of a top striker is rumoured to be US $6
million. Demand, as measured by attendances in stadiums or numbers of spectators watching live
broadcasts, has increased as well in recent years. In other words, the soccer business is becoming a
major amusement industry (Economist, 1997).
The two main reasons for interest in a particular soccer game, or in any sports contest, are the
quality of the play in absolute terms and the uncertainty about the outcome. The home games of
weak teams are usually sold out when the top teams visit. Strong teams tend to win their games
but sometimes they are taken by surprise by a weaker team. Most soccer a®cionados can recall
stories about a leader of a league who lost unexpectedly against a team that was at the bottom of
the league. In fact, soccer results are more random than the results of games in other sports as
only a few goals are scored each game and chance may be quite in¯uential in determining the
outcome. (The relationship between predictability and scores in different sports has been exam-
ined by Stefani (1983).)
Schemes such as sponsorship contracts, proceeds from the lucrative Champions League
competition (a European competition in which only a selected number of teams participate),
merchandizing and television rights allow wealthy teams to lure players away from poorer teams,
even to sit on the substitutes' bench. As a result, weak teams are concerned that an increasing
inequality in the income distribution of clubs leads to a decrease in the odds of beating strong
teams. Poorer teams used to receive revenues from transferring players with great talent to top
teams, but this source of income has vanished after the Bosman ruling. (According to the Bosman
ruling by the European Court of Justice, a soccer player from the European Community is a free
agent after his contract has expired.) This income could be used to improve training facilities for
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weaker teams or to increase the quality of the team by hiring players. The increased demand for
top players across Europe has sent salaries sky high with obvious repercussions for the salary
demands of mediocre players in average teams. These developments may cause a breakdown in
balance in competition between teams and hence may decrease interest in soccer in the long run.
Some weaker teams use these arguments to call for a redistribution of the proceeds of the sale of
television rights (both of the national competitions and of the Champions League).
This paper examines the development of the balance in competition in Dutch professional
soccer. Our aims are modest: we shall measure the balance in various ways, and we shall discuss
its development over time. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some
theory on balance in competition. In Section 3 we develop a simple statistical model that can be
used to analyse soccer results. The balance in competition and its evolution over time are
discussed in Section 4. We end with some conclusions and directions for further research in
Section 5.
2. Theory
Sports contests are interesting when there is not much difference in the quality of the contenders.
As Quirk and Fort (1992), page 243, put it:
`One of the key ingredients of the demand by fans for team sports is the excitement generated
because of uncertainty of outcome of league games. . . . In order to maintain fan interest, a sports
league has to ensure that teams do not get too strong or too weak relative to one another so that
uncertainty of outcome is preserved.'
In fact, this is cited as the reason why some sports organizations in the USA are exempted from
anti-trust regulation. Two teams engage in a joint production when they play a game. The outcome
and the quality of the game are the good that is sold to the public. The public is worse off when
the outcome of a game is easily predicted than if the game is tight. Therefore, collusion between
teams to increase the quality of the game may be in the public's interest. This view neglects the
absolute quality of the play. In fact, one of the important instruments to maintain balance in
competitions in the USA is the inverse draft system, where lower ranked teams can pick talented
new players before higher ranked teams can. In soccer leagues, there is no such balancing regu-
lation.
According to the view cited above, an important task for sport bodies like the Union of
European Football Associations or the Dutch Soccer Association is to maintain balance in com-
petition because it is needed to ensure long-term interest in the league. The instruments that are
available to achieve balance are limited, however. In the Netherlands, a court has decided in a
preliminary ruling that individual teams are the owners of the broadcasting rights and not the
organizing body. Each team can therefore sell its broadcasting rights individually and take the
proceeds of this transaction. An implicit subsidy from wealthy teams to poor teams by the
organizing body, to maintain balance, is no longer possible. Moreover, in contrast with baseball
and football in the USA, gate receipts are not split between both teams. This may favour teams
with big stadiums, even though a completely balanced competition is played (each pair of teams
meets twice, once at each venue). In addition, there are no salary caps, either for the teams in total
or for individual contracts in European soccer.
Balance in competition and regulations that intended to change it have been studied in the
American context but not in the context of European soccer. Neumann and Tamura (1996) studied
the balance in the National Football League in the USA. It is measured as the spread of parameters
in a non-linear regression model. These parameters capture the quality of the teams. Bennett and
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Fizel (1995) examined the effect of telecast deregulation on balance in competition in US college
football. They measured it by comparing actual performances in a league with the performances
that would be found if all teams were of equal strength (an approach developed by Noll (1991)
and Scully (1989)). Empirical results have also been published in Quirk and Fort (1992). They
measured the long-term development in ®ve American professional sports leagues. They measured
the balance by comparing the percentages of wins or losses for each league for each year with the
percentages we would expect to ®nd if all teams were equally strong. Each of the ®ve leagues that
they analysed showed a signi®cant imbalance, though the imbalance in both baseball leagues has
been decreasing in the last 20 or 30 years.
In the American literature, balance is usually de®ned as a win percentage of 50%. Such a
de®nition is not useful for soccer, because of the prevalence of draws (unless we consider a draw
to be a half-win). Draws are quite common in soccer. Over the period from 1956±1957 to 1996±
1997, 26% of all league games ended in a draw, 48% ended in a win by the home team and the
remaining 26% ended in a win for the away team. We de®ne a soccer league to be in perfect
balance for a certain year if the probability that any team wins a home game does not vary with
the opponent or with the team. We assume that the home ground advantage is equal for each team,
so in a balanced competition two teams would have equal probability of winning if the game were
played on a neutral ground. In a balanced competition the probability that a team wins its home
game may exceed the probability of a loss of a home game because of the home advantage. This
de®nition allows for home advantage that changes over time, while the league is still in complete
balance.
3. A model to analyse soccer results
3.1. The statistical model
In this section we propose a simple statistical model to analyse the outcome of soccer games. The
model is an extension of the model of Neumann and Tamura (1996) in that we allow for an
advantage for the home team. The strength of team i in the league is measured by a single
parameter ái. This parameter is independent of the opponent and venue of the game, and it is
assumed to be constant during the season. If we assume that team i plays at home and team j is
the away team, the difference in strength is ái ÿ á j. To allow for unmeasured characteristics (i.e.
those not captured by á), chance events during a game that in¯uence the score etc., we assume
that the outcome of the game is determined by the random variable D
ij
:
Dij  ái ÿ á j  hij  çij, i, j  1, . . ., 18, j 6 i: (1)
In equation (1), hij is the home ground advantage of team i over team j which is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean h. çij is a mean 0 random variable that captures other determinants
of the result of the game. If D
ij
is positive, team i is stronger than j, and D
ij
is negative if team j
is stronger than i. We do not observe the actual difference in strength; we only observe the
outcome of the game. In fact, we observe whether team i has won, has played a draw or lost













with Dij  1 if team i wins, Dij  0 if team i plays a draw and Dij  ÿ1 if team j (the away team)
Balance in Competition 421
wins the game. If we assume that hij and çij in equation (1) are independent normally distributed
(Eij  hij  çij  N (h, ó 2)), then the probabilities of the possible outcomes of a game are
Pr(Dij  1)  1ÿÖf(c2 ÿ ái  á j)=óg,
Pr(Dij  0)  Öf(c2 ÿ ái  á j)=óg ÿÖf(c1 ÿ ái  á j)=óg, (3)
Pr(Dij  ÿ1)  Öf(c1 ÿ ái  á j)=óg
with Ö() the standard normal distribution function and c1  c91 ÿ h and c2  c92 ÿ h.
The statistical model in equation (2) allows for a constant home ground advantage. Consider
two (hypothetical) teams of equal strength so that ái ÿ á j  0. The probability that the home team
wins is 1ÿÖ(c2=ó ) and the probability that the home team loses is Ö(c1=ó ). These two probab-
ilities are not constrained to be equal. In fact, we would expect that Ö(c1=ó ) , 1 ÿ Ö(c2=ó )
and this is con®rmed by the results of our estimation. The existence of a home advantage can be
examined formally by testing the hypothesis c1  ÿc2.
It is not possible to identify all the parameters of this model. First, we need to ®x the location
of the quality parameters á. We impose the identifying restriction Ó
i
ái  0 so that the parameters
á can be interpreted as deviations from a hypothetical average team with quality 0. A positive ái
implies that the quality of team i is better than average; a negative ái implies the opposite. In
addition, we ®x the scale of the model by imposing the standard normalization ó 2  1.
Model (3) resembles models used by Clarke and Norman (1995), Stefani (1980) and Kuk
(1995) to model soccer results. In Stefani (1980) and Clarke and Norman (1995), the dependent
variable is the goal difference, and their models are estimated by least squares techniques. By
using the least squares method, the dependent variable is assumed to follow a normal distribution.
However, the observed goal difference takes only integer values with a limited range. They allow
home ground advantage to vary between teams. The model in Kuk (1995) resembles the model
above in that the dependent variable is the result of the game (and not the goal difference), and
that an ordered probit model is used to derive the probability that a game is won, drawn or lost. In
his model, the quality of a team differs between home and away games, and the home advantage
varies between teams and over games. He estimated his model by using methods of moments
using only the ®nal ranking at the end of the season. An alternative approach could be based on
Poisson-like models for the exact score in a game; see for instance Maher (1982), Dixon and
Coles (1997) and Dixon and Robinson (1997). The reason that we prefer the ordered probit model
is the simplicity of model (2): the quality of each individual team is captured by a single
parameter. Moreover, this model allows for a simple separation between the measurement of
quality of the teams and home advantage. In addition, the values that the dependent variable take
are consistent with the stochastic speci®cation of the model. Poisson-like models are usually more
complex and have more parameters. For instance, in Maher (1982) at least two parameters per
team had to be estimated and these parameters are dif®cult to interpret. Maher also assumed that
the numbers of goals scored by the home team and the away team in a particular game are
statistically independent. This may be too strong an assumption. He also assumed that games are
mutually independent, an assumption that we shall make as well.
3.2. Description of the data and estimation results
The parameters were estimated by using the complete history of the Premier League of
professional soccer in the Netherlands. (The data were obtained from Michael Koolhaas (private
correspondence) and http://www.noord.bart.nl/kammenga/soccer.) Organization
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of the competition as we know it today was introduced in the 1955±1956 season. In the 1962±
1963, 1963±1964, 1964±1965 and 1965±1966 seasons only 16 teams participated in the Premier
League. In all the other seasons 18 teams participated. Rules for relegation to the ®rst division
have changed over time. In the last few seasons the team ®nishing last was relegated automatically
to the ®rst division. The teams ranked 16 and 17 had to play additional games against teams in the
®rst division. However, in earlier seasons, the teams ®nishing in the 17th and 18th places were
relegated without having to play additional games. In total, 54 different clubs have played in the
Premier League since the start of the competition in 1955±1956. Each year a couple of new teams
entered the competition, either because of mergers or because of promotion. (A list of all the
relevant mergers is given in Appendix A.) In each season, any combination of two teams meet
twice: once at each venue. Therefore, a competition with 18 teams consists of 306 games; in total
the data set comprises 12155 games. However, data from only 179 games are recorded from the
1996±1997 season.
We begin by estimating the parameters ái, c1 and c2. It is assumed that the quality of the teams
(measured by ái) and the home advantage (measured by c1 and c2) were constant during the
history of professional soccer. We use these results to calculate an all-time ranking of Dutch
soccer teams by pooling the data over all seasons. The parameters were estimated by maximization





[I ( Dij1) lnf1ÿÖ(c2 ÿ ái  á j)g  I (Dij0) lnfÖ(c2 ÿ ái  á j)ÿÖ(c1 ÿ ái  á j)g
 I (Dijÿ1) lnfÖ(c1 ÿ ái  á j)g]: (4)
In this equation, ô is the index indicating the season and I ô is the index set of teams playing in
the Premier League in season ô. The point estimates and their standard errors are given in Table 3
in Appendix A. The ordering of the parameters ái indicates an all-time ranking. The best three
teams have been Ajax (0.963), Feyenoord (0.750) and PSV Eindhoven (0.735), and the teams
performing least well have been Dordrecht (ÿ0:581), Fortuna SC (ÿ0:498) and SVV (ÿ0:433).
This ranking is not necessarily equal to the standard ranking in which two or three points are
awarded for each win and one for a draw. Teams that are relegated during some seasons do not
earn any points in this ranking and would be at the bottom of the standard ranking. In our
approach, there are no observations on a team if it does not participate in the Premier League
during a season. Hence, the estimated ái of a team that has participated in the Premier League for
two seasons only can exceed the estimated ái of a team that has played in the Premier League for,
say, three seasons, if that ®rst team played well during these two seasons. Indeed, we ®nd that the
teams with least points are not those with the smallest ái: these are Fortuna SC, SHS and
Alkmaar.
Second, we estimate the parameters for each year. This approach allows for variation in team-
speci®c quality over time. Fig. 1 presents estimates of the home advantage. Detailed information
on the individual estimates for each year is available on request. Home advantage is measured as
the difference between the probability that the home team wins if both teams are of equal quality
(i.e. ái  á j) and the probability that the away team wins. The circles depict the probability that
the home team wins and the triangles the probability that the away team wins. If there had been no
home advantage both sets would coincide (apart from sample variation). However, we see that
there is a clear home advantage which has increased markedly during the second half of the 1960s
to 33% in 1970±1971. Since the early 1970s, the probability that the home team wins against an
opponent of equal strength is approximately 45±50%. The corresponding probability for the away
team appears to have increased since then from approximately 15% to 20%. Therefore, home
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advantage decreased over that period. Indeed, over the 1990±1996 period, home advantage
averaged 21% compared with 31% in the period 1970±1975. Home advantage in the league varies
from year to year. This was also found by Clarke and Norman (1995). A test of whether c1  ÿc2
is rejected at any reasonable level of signi®cance for all years.
In Table 1, we present some summary statistics of the estimation results for each year. For each
season we list the strongest and the weakest teams, and the standard deviation of the estimated
áis. Instead of giving the point estimates for the ái-parameters, which are dif®cult to interpret, we
give a transformation of these estimates. If team i has quality ái in a given year, then the
probability that this team wins a home game against the hypothetical team with quality 0 is
1ÿÖ(ái ÿ c2). This probability is given in the third and ®fth columns of Table 1, where ð(n)
denotes the probability that the worst team in a given year beats the average team in a home game.
ð(1) is calculated similarly for the best team in that year. We have set c2  0:060, the value
obtained when estimating the model for the whole sample period. Hence, the variation in the
probabilities re¯ects variations in quality, not changes in home advantage.
Note that the maximum likelihood estimate for an ái would diverge to ÿ1 if a team loses all
its games during a season or to 1 if a team wins all its games. No such teams are to be found
even though Ajax came close in the 1971±1972 season by losing only one game, drawing in a
mere three games and winning all the other games.
3.3. Speci®cation tests
The model used in the previous sections is estimated by using maximum likelihood. The
parameters are estimated inconsistently if the distributional assumption of normality is not correct.
We tested whether we should reject the assumption of normality against the more general
alternative that the distribution of the error terms belongs to a member of the Pearson family of
distributions (for details of the test statistic we refer to Glewwe (1997) and Weiss (1997)).
Members of the Pearson family include the normal, t- and Ã-distributions. Essentially, we test
Fig. 1. Probabilities of winning of home (O) and away (n) games when the teams are of equal strength
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whether the third moment of E is 0 and the fourth moment of E is 3. The test statistic was
calculated for each year that the model was estimated. The null hypothesis of normality was not
rejected in any season at a 5% level of signi®cance. This conclusion is not at odds with the Poisson
assumption that is often made when analysing soccer scores. The score difference is estimated by
summing over a large number of Poisson-distributed scores, and hence in the limit it can be
approximated by a normal distribution. Clarke and Norman (1995) also found that the residuals
were approximately normally distributed when they estimated a model similar to equation (1) by
least squares.
We tested whether or not restrictions on the parameters could be imposed. First, for each year
all estimated ái were found to be jointly signi®cantly different from 0. Second, the hypothesis that
Table 1. Best and worst team for each year
Year Worst team ð( n) Best team ð(1) Standard
deviation
1956 eindhoven 0.259 ajax 0.714 0.320
1957 den bosch 0.260 sc enschede 0.679 0.273
1958 shs 0.212 sparta 0.755 0.412
1959 sittardia 0.196 ajax 0.735 0.363
1960 noad 0.212 feyenoord 0.776 0.386
1961 rapid jc 0.263 feyenoord 0.730 0.308
1962 volewijckers 0.112 psv 0.700 0.399
1963 blauw-wit 0.265 dws 0.706 0.362
1964 nac 0.335 feyenoord 0.747 0.270
1965 heracles 0.297 ajax 0.867 0.466
1966 willem ii 0.143 ajax 0.863 0.537
1967 sittardia 0.212 ajax 0.898 0.529
1968 fortuna sc 0.175 feyenoord 0.894 0.628
1969 svv 0.144 ajax 0.918 0.600
1970 az 0.128 feyenoord 0.904 0.739
1971 volendam 0.168 ajax 0.959 0.725
1972 den bosch 0.179 ajax 0.931 0.678
1973 groningen 0.233 feyenoord 0.865 0.595
1974 wageningen 0.261 psv 0.852 0.520
1975 excelsior 0.216 psv 0.810 0.501
1976 de graafschap 0.273 ajax 0.794 0.429
1977 telstar 0.165 psv 0.795 0.443
1978 vvv 0.134 ajax 0.841 0.539
1979 haarlem 0.323 ajax 0.749 0.352
1980 wageningen 0.257 az 0.888 0.486
1981 de graafschap 0.122 ajax 0.852 0.552
1982 nec 0.259 ajax 0.887 0.514
1983 ds79 0.163 feyenoord 0.860 0.560
1984 pec zwolle 0.200 ajax 0.813 0.446
1985 heracles 0.123 psv 0.896 0.550
1986 excelsior 0.223 psv 0.894 0.484
1987 ds79 0.138 psv 0.877 0.476
1988 veendam 0.306 psv 0.808 0.370
1989 haarlem 0.167 ajax 0.736 0.403
1990 nec 0.292 psv 0.812 0.440
1991 vvv 0.120 psv 0.875 0.576
1992 fortuna sc 0.252 feyenoord 0.792 0.467
1993 cambuur 0.233 ajax 0.820 0.409
1994 dordrecht 0.238 ajax 0.914 0.556
1995 go ahead eagles 0.197 ajax 0.872 0.550
1996 az 0.237 psv 0.795 0.422
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the home advantage is constant over time had to be rejected. We also rejected the hypothesis that
the quality of a given team does not vary over time.
If we assume that the quality parameters ái remain constant over time, it is possible to test for
variation in the variance of the error term in model (2). We imposed this restriction, and re-
estimated the model for the period from 1991±1992 to 1996±1997 with unrestricted variances.
We could not reject the null hypothesis that the variance of Eij is constant over time.
4. Empirical evidence of balance in competition
In this paper we measure the balance in competition in three different ways.
(a) If the standard deviation óP of the number of points in the ®nal ranking of a competition
is small, there is not much spread in the points gained at the end of the season and the
competition has been tight.
(b) Since ái is the extent to which team i is better than a hypothetical team with quality 0, it is





. This is proportional to the standard deviation óá of the quality parameters of the
statistical model of the previous section. Again, if this number is small, the quality of the
teams does not vary much.
(c) The concentration ratio CRK is de®ned as the number of points obtained by the top K
teams divided by the number of points that they could have gained. If there are J teams in
a competition the team winning the competition could have obtained 2W (J ÿ 1) points
where W is the number of points awarded for a game won. We denote the number of points






KW (2J ÿ K ÿ 1), (5)
the number of points actually obtained by the K best teams divided by the maximum
number of points that they could have obtained. If the concentration ratio is high, the top
K teams did not lose many points to weaker teams.
These three measures are to some extent `static' as they refer to balance within a particular
season. An advantage of the second measure compared with the ®rst measure is that it does not
require that the season be complete. The concentration ratio is not a measure of balance in the
whole competition; it applies to the quality of the top teams. This measure is interesting though as
it is commonly believed that the gap between top teams and the rest has increased over time. It is
not possible to address this issue with the ®rst two measures.
The ®rst two measures are not completely equivalent: a crucial drawback of óP as a measure of
balance in competition is that it is not invariant under changes in home advantage. As our statis-
tical model separates home advantage and team quality, óá does not suffer from this drawback.
Moreover, in the 1995±1996 season the number of points obtained for a win was raised from 2 to
3. In contrast with the standard deviation of the number of points, the standard deviation of the ái
is invariant to changes in the number of points awarded for a win or a draw. Finally, we can
estimate the ái and their standard deviations even if a season is not ®nished completely. Note that
óP and óá may rise if the average scoring frequency of all teams increases. In this case, skilled
teams accumulate more wins whereas less skilled teams accumulate more losses, leading to more
dispersion in the point and quality distributions. This is of little practical importance as goal
scoring does not vary much over the years.
Estimates of óP and óá are graphed in Fig. 2. The standard deviation of the ái varies between
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0.25 and 0.75, and the standard deviation of the number of points varies between 5.9 and 13.5. To
interpret the level of óP and óá we have simulated two hypothetical competitions and calculated
óP and óá for each simulated competition. In the ®rst competition, each team is equally strong
and has a 50% probability of winning a home game, a 25% probability of playing a draw and 25%
of losing a home game. For this case, the average value of óP is 4.92, and the average value of óá
is 0.20.
In the second simulation the probabilities are the same, except for three strong teams. These
three strong teams win games against each of the remaining 15 weaker opponents with 90%
probability (and a 5% probability of a draw and a 5% probability of a loss). In this second case,
the average value of óP is 9.87, and the average value of óá is 0.46. Therefore, a competition with
three strong teams and 15 identical weaker teams gives the same values for óP and óá as we ®nd
in Fig. 2.
The balance in competition has not changed systematically from the early start of professional
soccer in 1955 until the mid-1960s. We then see a marked decrease between 1965 and 1970
followed by an increase in between 1970 and 1976. Coincidentally (or not) it was in the period
1966±1970 that Dutch professional soccer caught up with the best teams in Europe. Ajax was the
®rst Dutch ®nalist in a European tournament in the spring of 1969 and Feyenoord was the ®rst
Dutch winner in a European tournament in 1970. Dutch (and European) soccer was dominated by
Ajax from 1970 until 1973, a period when the balance in competition in Dutch soccer increased
sharply.
From the mid-1970s to the end of the century there is no clear trend in the balance in
competition. One year, competition is tighter than in another year, but no clear trends are
discernible from the data. The spread from year to year is considerable; years with a tight
competition are interspersed with years with a one-sided competition. This is especially
noteworthy because it was feared in the early 1980s that competition would become less tight
because of shirt sponsorship which in Dutch soccer has been allowed from the 1981±1982 season
onwards. At ®rst, it seemed that criticism of shirt sponsorship was justi®ed, since in the 1981±
Fig. 2. Standard deviations of the estimated ái (´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ ´) and of the numbers of points (ÐÐÐ)
Balance in Competition 427
1982 season two teams could not ®nd a sponsor at all. This was only temporary though: even
amateur teams now have shirt sponsors. Some teams have had better sponsoring deals than others,
resulting in a more unequal distribution of income. This increase in income inequality is claimed
to lead to a decrease in balance in competition. However, we do not ®nd any evidence for this
hypothesis. Less successful teams use the same arguments as those used against shirt sponsorship
to oppose television contracts that give a larger share of the revenue to more successful teams.
According to them, an unequal distribution of television revenues will lead to an unequal
distribution of quality and this leads to a decrease in general interest in soccer. However, the
balance in competition has not decreased signi®cantly since the introduction of shirt sponsor-
ship. In fact, shirt sponsorship may have enabled most semiprofessional players to become full
professionals and this may have increased the overall quality of soccer.
To examine the robustness of our results, we have estimated two other models. First, we
estimated the quality parameters of the teams by using the model of Clarke and Norman (1995).
In this model the dependent variable was the difference in goals scored, and the parameters were
estimated by using least squares. In the second model, the ordered probit structure of equation (3)
was retained, but two additional categories were added. The dependent variable now makes a
distinction between a win (or loss) by a three-goal difference (or more). In both cases, the variation
in the estimated quality parameters was examined, and it turned out that the results were very
similar to those in Fig. 2. Hence, our conclusions about the development of the balance in
competition are robust with respect to the statistical model used.
As a third indicator of the balance in competition, we look at the concentration ratios for the
®rst and fourth place. The results are given in Fig. 3. Qualitatively, we see the same picture as in
the previous graphs: until the mid-1960s the top team in each year captured only 75% of the
number of points that it could have obtained at the end of the season. This percentage increases
during the second half of the 1960s, to a maximum of 94% for the top team in 1971±1972. Then
an increase in the balance of competition sets in, followed by an irregular period with no clear
trends. The picture is slightly different for the top four teams: a slight upward trend of the
Fig. 3. Concentration ratios for the ®rst and fourth places: ÐÐÐ, ®rst place; ..........., fourth place
428 R. H. Koning
concentration ratio during the 1980s and 1990s is visible. (CR4 exceeds CR1 in a particular year if
the number of points obtained by the teams that end second, third and fourth does not differ much
from the number of points obtained by the team that ended ®rst (i.e. if P(2)  P(3)  P(4) .
(45=17)P(1)). This happens in 13 seasons.) Contrary to common opinion and despite the slight
upward trend, the value of CR4 is not high when compared with typical values encountered during
the 1960s.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the balance in competition in Dutch professional soccer. We used
a simple model to estimate the quality of the teams participating in the Premier League. We ®nd
that the balance decreased markedly during the second half of the 1960s and increased during
the ®rst half of the 1970s but that there has been no clear trend since. We also ®nd that the
introduction of shirt sponsorship did not lead to a noticeable signi®cant decrease in the balance.
These conclusions are borne out by three different measures of balance and hence are not sensitive
to model speci®cation.
This paper provides only a starting-point for a more structural economic analysis of the balance
in competition. The `superstar' model of Rosen (1981) may provide insight into why an increase
in income inequality that may have taken place did not lead to a decrease in the balance of
competition. Another issue to be resolved is to examine whether the lack of recent trends in the
balance of competition is speci®c to Dutch soccer or whether it is a more international phenom-
enon.
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Appendix A: Estimation results of the complete model
In this appendix we discuss the construction of our data set and give estimation results of the model with
the ái constant during the sample period. First, in Table 2 we give a list of mergers in Dutch professional
soccer. (The list is based on information provided in Verkammen and Vermeer (1994).) Some teams have
played under several names. For instance, FC Dordrecht changed its name in 1979 to DS '79 and in 1990
again to Dordrecht '90. In other cases, professional soccer teams merged with other professional soccer
teams (for example, in 1991 Dordrecht '90 merged with SVV to form SVV/Dordrecht '90 which
changed its name again in 1992, reverting to Dordrecht '90). We have treated each team that resulted
from a merger as a new team, so we distinguish between DS '79 (a predecessor of Dordrecht '90 that
played in the Premier League in 1987±1988) and Dordrecht '90 that resulted from a merger with SVV.
In the same vein, FC Amsterdam before 1974 is considered to be a different team from FC Amsterdam
after the year when it merged with De Volenwijckers.
In Table 3 we give the estimation results of the model estimated over the period 1956±1996 in which
all parameters are constant over time. The number of cases is 12155, and the mean log-likelihood is
ÿ0:980507.
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